At the Tehran meeting in November 1943, Stalin promised his Western allies to support the coming Normandy invasion with all his might. That is to say, he guaranteed that there would be a formidable attack on the eastern front synchronized with Operation Overlord. The idea was, of course, to get the Germans to move troops from the "Atlantic Wall" to the East in time for the landings.

It is easy to imagine the type and timing of measures that would bring about such a transfer of German troops. According to a statement given on 7 April, the landings were scheduled to begin round about 31 May 1944, and on 23 April General Antonov informed the Americans that the Red Army would attack on the same date. The Russian pressure on the eastern front should, however, preferably have reached a maximum already in the middle of May or soon after. Let us visualize a scenario of a possible accomplishment of such a pressure.

Scenario: In April the Red Army starts sounding the German front lines for weak points. These soundings are followed by minor attacks exploiting some of the weak spots. In the beginning of May a vigorous Red Army offensive ensues in the southernmost sector where the roads are dry enough to permit heavy traffic. The Ploesti oilfields would be the natural objective of this operation. At the same time Stalin offers a truce to Finland on terms he knows to be acceptable to the Finnish Government. After the truce has taken effect he moves a number of divisions from the Finnish to the German front. The Black Sea Fleet prevents the Germans from evacuating their Seventeenth Army from the Crimea (where it had been isolated since December 1943). Then about the end of May when all the road network has dried up, a "steamroller" offensive is launched on large parts of the Eastern front between Lake Peipus and the Black Sea.

A set of measures like these would no doubt have been very effective, since the Red Army had already demonstrated its superiority, being in almost continual progress during the previous nine months. Solely from January to April the Red Army had recaptured an area almost as large as Great Britain or Romania–a manifest demonstration of its capability. A renewed demonstration in May would have caused Hitler to direct his reserves to the east rather than to the west. This, in its turn, would have facilitated the task of the forces about to establish a beachhead in Normandy. Capturing Ploesti would have deprived Hitler of his most important source of fuel.

Now let us see how Stalin fulfilled his self-imposed obligations to his allies and his promise to attack on D-day¹. From mid April he called a halt to all offensive activity on the main eastern front. This virtual cease-fire was to last until two full weeks after D-day. During April and May, Soviet ground forces were engaged against the Germans only on the Crimea. There the Red Army began chasing the 17^th Army towards the evacuation ports Sevastopol and Evpatoriya. From these ports the German troops were freighted away to Constanta in Romania. The Cherno-Morskiy Flot (‘Black Sea Fleet’), then comprising one battleship, four cruisers and a number of submarines and smaller craft, based again on recaptured Novorossisk, did nothing to stop the transports. The Germans regarded this passivity as incomprehensible². Said the German Captain H.D. von Conrady: "No German soldier would have reached the Romanian coast from the Crimea […] if the Russian Black Sea Fleet had not remained inactive […]"³. The Soviet intervention was confined to a number of air raids. On 13 May the 17^th Army had left the peninsula and was at Hitler’s disposal–albeit heavily decimated. About the same time Stalin concentrated 30 divisions on the Karelian Isthmus against the six Finnish divisions standing there, guarding Finland’s pre-War frontier. At the time it was obvious that the Finnish government was willing to give up at least the better part of the Isthmus in exchange for a truce. The Soviet preponderance in forces was far in excess of the military requirements, let alone the political ones. Sooner or later the German intelligence would probably take cognizance of this rather unexpected deployment of forces. It would then serve as a message from Stalin to Hitler: "Look, I am withdrawing troops from the Russo-German front, so you have less to fear there, now at the prospect of your critical fight in France."

Stalin may have hoped that the Germans would move their 17^th army and other troops from the East to the Atlantic coast in order to reinforce the defense against invasion. He certainly realized that a substantial superiority in forces might make it possible for Hitler to throw the invading army back into the sea. Most probably he also realized the immense importance of the Ploesti oil fields for the logistics and the air force on the German side.

Anyway, the month of May passed by, and nothing happened on the eastern front. The invasion forces lingered on. When General Deane in Moscow finally told the Russian liaison officer General Antonov that the landings were to take place on 6 June, he received the answer that the Red Army offensive "was prepared according to the Tehran agreement. It will begin on one of the most important sectors of the front in mid June and develop into a general offensive before mid July."⁴ (This was, of course, very far from the essence of the Tehran agreement and from the promise of 23 April.) Came D-day, 6 June, and still the calm continued as far as the German front in the East was concerned. But just three days later, on 9 June, a formidable offensive was indeed ordered by Stalin, but not against Ploesti. It was launched by General L.A. Govorov against the six Finnish divisions defending the 70 km long front on the Karelian Isthmus. Govorov disposed of four times as many men as the defenders, five times as many armors, six times as much artillery and 15 times as many aircraft. The attack was launched on the very date when it could not be doubted any more that the landings in Normandy represented the real invasion. The fighting on the Isthmus was to continue until mid July and it did not engage any German troops, save one solitary division during the first part of July. From the point of view of the anti-German alliance this theater was one of the least important front sectors, and the offensive may seem rather superfluous. Whenever Germany was to be defeated, Finland (like e.g. Poland) would have no option but to yield to any peace terms Stalin would choose to dictate. But certainly Stalin did not order a costly offensive if he considered it meaningless. He must have had some purpose for the offensive. If so, what could have been his purpose?

The general Soviet offensive on the eastern front began on 22 June. This happened at a time when it was quite clear that the Anglo-Americans had established themselves irrevocably on the Continent. It must have been obvious to both Hitler and Stalin that the invaders could not be thrown back into the sea any more–at least not as long as the Germans had to fight the Red Army simultaneously. The total inactivity in May and June, together with the conspicuous attack on a non-German enemy (i.e. Finland) was tantamount to a veiled message from Stalin. It should have convinced Hitler that he had nothing to fear on his eastern front at the crucial moment when the Western powers were about to establish their beachhead and Hitler had his last chance to throw them back into the sea. If he managed to do this, it would have taken the Anglo-Americans about a year to organize a new invasion and the Red Army would have had plenty of time to beat Hitler’s forces all the way from Poland to France. Maybe Stalin pinned his fate on Overlord turning out a dead failure without his backing it up. In that case the short period of fighting in Normandy would serve as a perfect opportunity for Stalin to conquer Finland before he concentrated all his forces against the German Army. Finland would be indispensable as a base for a later attack on Sweden and Norway. The 30 divisions may not have been able to evolve all their capability on the rather narrow Karelian Isthmus, but they would certainly have come in handy later on. After conquering the Isthmus there would have remained subduing a whole country and putting down possible local attempts at resistance.

If the invasion had indeed miscarried, Stalin might have won command of most of Europe before the Western powers had got time to organize a new and more effective invasion. But already in mid June Stalin’s hope for this kind of outcome must have dwindled. Hitler had not taken advantage of Stalin’s generous offer, and his western reserves were totally inadequate for an effective counteroffensive against the invaders. At that time Stalin would have realized that Hitler was not going to weaken his eastern front any more by removing troops from east to west. Obviously the situation was as advantageous as it could ever be, and this at last caused Stalin to launch the grand offensive against the Germans. The campaign was commanded by Field Marshal Shukov and began on 22 June in Byelorussia–with further inactivity in the Ploesti direction. It soon brought about a breakthrough. Within little more than a weak Vitebsk, Mogilev and Minsk were captured together with 100,000 square kilometers of land. At the same time one Red Army division after the other was withdrawn from the Finnish front for a much-needed restoration. After Govorov had taken Vyborg and having come up against an unexpectedly hard resistance, Stalin apparently suspended any plans to capture the entire country.

Instead he concentrated on a totally different scheme⁵. Through the Japanese Ambassador Oshima and in the holy name of Tenno (‘the Celestial’ i.e. the Emperor) he offered Hitler peace. On 14 July Oshima sought audience with Hitler and eventually delivered a message implying that the Emperor was prepared at any time to mediate a peace between Hitler and Stalin, in case Hitler should want it. The seriousness of this offer may be concluded from the German diplomat Fritz Hesse’s observation that the Japanese must have inquired at Moscow and got a positive answer there. He thinks that the Japanese would not have abused the holy name of the Tenno in a play for high stakes. Therefore the Japanese bid certainly had full Russian coverage. When this unexpected bid was discussed on 17 July, Hitler got so irresolute that he wanted to consult Mussolini before answering. But before Mussolini had arrived in East Prussia the whole scheme became completely overshadowed by the attempt on Hitler’s life on 20 July. The Soviet offensive went on in the Baltic States and Byelorussia.

Late in August, Stalin finally made up his mind about Ploesti. A short offensive caused Romania to defect, and within a couple of weeks both Ploesti and Constanta were in Soviet hands. With a little good will the Red Army could probably have achieved the same outcome two or three months earlier.

Although the Germans must have expected the Red Army to behave quite differently from what it did, neither the generals nor Hitler himself seem to have reacted in any special way on the erratic calm on the front. They probably considered it to be the lull before a storm that could break out any day.

From the point of view of the Western Allies, Stalin’s strategic disposition was tantamount to a breach of faith. The Soviet Dictator had certainly not facilitated Operation Overlord in the least. If anything, he had augmented Hitler’s chances to ward off the invasion. Stalin’s behavior would have been reason enough for Churchill and Roosevelt to cease complying with Stalin’s every wish. They could certainly have used on the western front some of the war equipment that was actually shipped to Russia. Also there would still have been time to redirect Operation Anvil from southern France (where Stalin wanted it to take place) to the Balkan Peninsula instead. To their eternal shame both leaders were gullible enough to trust "Uncle Joe" even after this flagrant deceit. Although they must have been flabbergasted, they behaved as if the Red Army attack on 22 June was just the kind of D-day support that had been agreed upon. The Anglo-American forces even proceeded through Germany in a way that permitted the Red Army to win the race towards Berlin, Vienna and Prague, thus enhancing Stalin’s prestige.

Anyway, the Western Allies were not gullible to such a degree as to base their preparations of Overlord on the assumption that Stalin would draw all the German reserves to the eastern front. At least they counted with the possibility that Stalin might not always do his utmost to beat the main enemy.

The Finnish military command was certainly taken by surprise as well⁶. The headquarters had simply taken for granted that Stalin would attack the German front as soon as the necessary spring break was over. That would mean that Stalin’s summer offensive would start somewhere in the south, leaving Finland untouched. This was nothing less than wishful thinking, especially since Finland had recently rejected the peace terms offered by Stalin. It should have been obvious that Stalin wanted to put an end to the Finnish war in one way or another. Since his first attempt–air raids on Helsinki--had proved fruitless he could therefore be expected to try with another arm. And, as a matter of fact, already on 15 April–-a month after Finland’s refusal to accept the drastic peace terms offered–-the Russians were observed digging new trenches towards the Finnish positions on the Karelian Isthmus. On 5 May the Soviet railway traffic on the Isthmus seemed to increase. About the middle of May the Finnish reconnaissance reported constant digging of new storming trenches despite heavy Finnish firing. Day after day more and more indications of an imminent attack were seen and reported. But the highest in command had made up their minds about Stalin’s intentions through strategic reasoning. Consequently they were not impressed by reconnaissance reports that did not conform to these presumed intentions. For instance, artillery tractors and horses, which had been loaned to nearby farmers, were not ordered back to the regiments. Things came to such a pass that Lieutenant General Aksel Airo, then Quartermaster General, played down the wordings of an alarming reconnaissance report of 22 May 1944 before it was shown to Marshal Mannerheim–in order "not to worry" this 77 year old Supreme Commander.

At the last moment, about 36 hours before the Soviet attack, Lieutenant Nils-Erik Stenbäck at the Finnish Military Intelligence was able to warn the Headquarters of the imminent attack. This was possible because Stenbäck, when serving as Military Attaché in Washington, had made friends with his Swedish colleague Curt Wennberg. The latter, back home in Stockholm, had somehow managed to get information about the Soviet plan and immediately phoned his friend at the Finnish Headquarters. Even this warning was, however, disregarded. An officer who wanted to deliver the warning to Mannerheim was turned down by Airo who denied him access to the Marshal, "don't worry him, he is old and sick". Mannerheim was left uninformed⁹.

Consequently, not very much was done to prepare for a sudden Soviet attack. Above all, the Finnish troops had got used to a state of leisure occupation and comfort after three years of idleness within locked positions. They expected the war to end in the near future and were not mentally prepared for a sudden change. On Mannerheim’s orders the forefront line was designed to function as the main line of defense. Airo had recommended the topographically stronger middle line instead. The Marshal, however, based his decision on his front commanders, who preferred their "own" line as the main position, which they intended to hold at all costs. In many respects this forefront line was rather elaborated (and certainly comfortable), but parts of it consisted merely of a simple trench. It definitely lacked depth. The middle and rear lines, although topographically better suited, were not completed yet. The transfer of troops and artillery from the forefront line to the middle line had not been prepared at all. Seven percent of the men were on leave and an even larger part of the tractors and horses was not at hand. These circumstances lead to an extremely dangerous outcome. After thorough preparations and an enormous concentration of artillery, the sudden Red Army attack brought about a break of the forefront line within a couple of days. Occasional cases of rout occurred. Too late, the troops from this line then hastened to man the empty middle line. While the manning operation was still in progress on 14 June, even this line was overrun and the Finnish forces had to withdraw to the rear line, which still lacked anti-tank appliances and most other kinds of fixture. At this stage, however, reserves had managed to get in place and the troops had recovered their morale. The defense finally succeeded in stopping the further advancement of the Red Army, albeit at the cost of heavy casualties. The struggle about the rear line went on for a whole month without other results than heavy losses on both sides.

Realizing the difficulties to break the rear line, the Soviets tried instead to circumvent it by means of an oversea attack. A similar operation had succeeded in the Winter War since the Finnish Navy did not intervene. Again the much-dreaded armored ship Väinämöinen with its four 254 mm guns had not interfered when the defense line in front of Vyborg was attacked and broken within hours on 20 June. This was a clear indication that the Commander of the Finnish Naval Forces, Lieutenant General Väinö Valve, would not make use of this ship for any active service, however urgent the need. Therefore Vice-admiral Juriy Rall (who commanded the fleet at Kronshtadt) could safely send a flotilla of small craft together with the gunboats Kama and Volga intended to transfer three of Govorov’s divisions across the Gulf of Vyborg. The operation was begun on 30 June. As a first step, the islands in the Gulf had to be captured. Units from the Finnish Coast Artillery defended the islands. For want of regular guns the gunners had to fight as infantrymen. The single German division under Major General H. Breusing prepared itself to defend only the shoreline and did not step in on the islands. As could be expected, heavy casualties ensued and the islands had to be abandoned anyway, after just two days of fighting. Thereafter both the Finnish and the German units directed their energies towards defending the shoreline against the heavy attacks that started on 5 July. These efforts were fortunately crowned with success, even if it was a near thing. On 9 July the Soviets made a last attempt to get a foothold on the northern shore of the Gulf of Vyborg. Since even this proved to be abortive, the whole flotilla retired to Kronshtadt.

After a whole month of heavy fighting the Soviet forces had not been able to accomplish a decisive breakthrough on any of the Finnish fronts. On top of it all, the troops were rather worn out and could hardly achieve anything without receiving substantial reinforcements. Apparently realizing this, Stalin gave up his attempt at conquering Finland about mid July 1944. It has generally been assumed that this decision was caused by the urgent need of more troops on the German front. Recently available Russian military records demonstrate, however, that this was not the case⁷. Instead it is now evident that especially Govorov’s forces had suffered such serious losses that they had become outright unfit for active service. The losses amounted to about 100,000 men and hundreds of tanks and aircraft. The morale was at the lowest. The natural thing to do was to reorganize the units in peace and quiet so that they could be used eventually in the final stage of the War (against Germany). Therefore the fighting on the Finnish front was allowed to peter out awaiting a negotiated solution. Such a one was realized on 2 September 1944, when Finland accepted Stalin’s armistice terms–-actually a little bit easier than those offered in February and rejected in March.

Curiously enough, the idea of Väinämöinen as a permanent menace to be eliminated under all circumstances seems to have stuck to the Soviet command. Colonel General S.F. Zhavoronkov got 131 aircraft for the task of sinking the ship. As late as 16 July his carefully elaborated plan was carried out. This was two days after Stalin having sent word that he was willing to end the war with Finland without demanding unconditional surrender (simultaneously with Oshima’s call in Berlin). Consequently it was obvious that Väinämöinen would not attack the Red Banner Fleet any more, particularly since it had kept in hiding when its intervention had been essential. Any intact Finnish warship could of course be claimed as reparations whenever the victor dictated his peace terms. The Soviet air force succeeded in sinking the presumed Väinämöinen, which in reality was a 46 year old German AA-ship, Niobe. This ship emulated Väinämöinen in everything except the four heavy guns. Apparently the 131 Soviet aircrews did not notice this remarkable want, and Rear Admiral A.P. Aleksandrov of the Soviet Control Commission was quite taken aback in the fall 1944 when he was invited on board the "resurrected" and totally intact Väinämöinen. Stalin finally got the ship as booty in 1947.

Considering all the mistakes made by the Finnish supreme command, it is something like a miracle that the Finnish troops were able to stop the Soviet offensive at the rear line, thus saving the country from occupation. Not to use the three years of positional war to reinforce the middle and rear lines into adequate fortifications defies common sense. The failure to react upon the reported concentration of Soviet forces was also a serious blunder. These failures could easily have cost Finland its independence. This risk was further enhanced by the unforgivable absence of Väinämöinen during the critical stage of impending breakthrough at the Vyborg sector.

The most interesting episode in the shade of Overlord was perhaps Stalin’s peace offer to Hitler. It was given when the Anglo-Americans forces already surpassed the German ones, but were still contained in a limited beachhead, not larger than the Crimea. Stalin probably suspected that some junta of prudent German officers would seize the opportunity, remove Hitler and seek separate peace with the Western Allies. In such a case it would be a matter of utmost urgency to forestall the coup. The whole of Poland, Latvia and Lithuania would not have been too high a prize to offer Hitler in order to guarantee that the war in the West would continue. With peace in the East the fight in France could be intensified and more evenly matched, which would certainly benefit Stalin’s overall planning. With both the Germans and the Anglo-Americans utterly worn out after another year or two of bloody battles, Stalin could hope eventually to grab a considerable part of Europe for himself.

But how could Stalin expect to reach an understanding with Hitler? Well, this had been done once before, in August 1939. Then Ribbentrop had negotiated in Moscow, and on 17 July 1944⁵ he actually assured Hitler that he and Stalin "had understood each other superbly, so why not now again?" Stalin naturally remembered the same occasion and drew the same conclusion.

Stalin would of course take every opportunity to return to his original scheme of power policy, i.e. to make the capitalist powers destroy each other in order to easily defeat all of them. The Soviet Colonel G.A. Tokaev after his defection described what he had heard from a friend in the Kremlin oligarchy in 1939: "Sooner or later America will come into the war on the side of Britain and France. Unless we aid Hitler by sending him fuel and other necessities, there is every reason to suppose that in the face of this formidable alliance, he will crack up–before the German home front is irreparably exhausted. Germany’s industrial potential would remain unimpaired, and the British, French and American armies would still be full of fight. That is why we must give Hitler every assistance in our power to prolong the war as long as possible and free him from his well-known dread of having to fight on two fronts"⁸.

Again there was the risk that Hitler would crack up too early, while the British and American forces were still full of fight. And again the remedy was to free Hitler from having to fight on two fronts.

Stalin had cherished the idea of Soviet expansion by means of a World War ever since 1925. He had soon realized that Hitler was the man who could pave the way for a war and Stalin had done what he could to help Hitler into power. Hitler had proved very useful indeed. He had made a clean sweep of democracy in Germany and he had started World War II. Admittedly, he had forestalled Stalin with his attack on 22 June 1941 thereby causing a certain setback, a lot of devastated land and some millions of casualties. Stalin was, however, magnanimous enough to overlook such minor faults. He would readily let bygones be bygones. With a little bit of luck Hitler could still be made to engage the armies of Germany, United Kingdom and United States in a life-and-death struggle on the coast of France. This prospect must have seemed too tempting to be left unexplored.

With a maximum of luck Stalin would have ended up with all of Europe north of the Alps in his possession. As it was, he had to content himself with about half that booty, not too bad considering that everybody else was a loser. I regard this outcome as the distinguishing mark of a strategic genius. Not everybody agrees, however. Said Mr. Alexander M. Haig, Jr. in a private letter dated 1 March 1983: "I tend to agree with Churchill’s belief, expressed in his speeches at the time and later in his History that Stalin had revealed himself as a completely outwitted strategic bungler." Admittedly, from the point of view of the Soviet people Stalin was much worse than worthless. Like a chessplayer who sacrifices any number of his chessmen if necessary for winning the game, so Stalin sacrificed 25 to 30 millions of his people in order to achieve his aim. This aim apparently was to obtain personal power of the largest possible part of the earth and he certainly considered World War II a big step in that direction, though by no means the final one.

In his struggle for power, Stalin got much help from what Lenin used to call "useful idiots". Others tried to stop him wit poor results. In spite of its many blunders, the Finnish Army proved to be the power that yielded the least to this despot, the greatest of all times.