The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact provoked the outbreak of WW II
New evidence indicates Stalin as the architect of the Pact
By Carl O. Nordling
The MRP (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) caused Hitler to dare defying the Western Powers and to start a war with prospects of being a lengthy one. Stalin anticipated that this war was going to exhaust both parties whereupon the Red Army could easily make big conquests.
The evidence that reveals these intentions of Stalin has been found in:
Stalin’s speech to the Politburo on
A news item in The Times on August 26, p. 9;
A news item in Svenska
The Stalin interview in Pravda on
The consular report from
Stalin, "The Champion for Peace"
It is well known that it took about 2,000 years for Ekphantos’s theory on the earth as a boll revolving around its axis to become generally accepted. Almost everyone relied on such authorities as Aristotle and he Catholic Church, who were against it. It is a prevalent conception that such a dependence upon authorities belongs to the distant past. This is, however, an entirely false conception. What will be presented below is just a counterpart in the field of history to the prolonged conception of the earth as the center of the Universe, in spite of disproving evidence.
Many books about World War II
describe how Stalin in 1939 manoeuvred in order to keep the
Most established historians argue
that in such a situation Stalin had no alternative but to enter into a pact
with Hitler instead. By way of example, A. J. P. Taylor (1906-90), the
well-known English Professor of History, wrote1: "It is
difficult to see what other course Soviet Russia could have followed." He
thinks the Ribbentrop-Pact was in the last resort anti-German: "It limited
the German advance eastwards in case of war." Apparently
The actual result of the Pact was,
The situation at
Also the guarantee (through the
Pact) that the Western Powers would be at war before a possible attack on the
Hitler had chanced upon a pact
with Stalin in the hope thereby to deter the Western Powers from fulfilling
their obligations to enter the War on the side of
Taylor and Carr seem to have been obsessed by a desire to describe Stalin (1879-1953) in the most favorable light apart from any logical considerations. In spite of their lack of evidence they have "founded a school". Still, now at the turn of the century one finds Stalin described as a peacekeeping leader who eventually falls victim to a war instigator beyond his control, namely Hitler. Most encyclopedias agree that the Pact was a defensive measure in some way or other. That was certainly exactly what Stalin wanted his "useful idiots" to believe.
Stalin informing about his "grand strategy"
At the same time as he fed
propaganda phrases to the masses Stalin wanted to inform his intelligent
henchmen of the real purpose with the Pact. He also found various ways to do it
without disturbing the belief of he idiots. The members of the Politburo could
be informed in plain language at a secret meeting, of course. This took place
on 19 August 1939, just four days before the signing of the Pact. The minutes
from this meeting were published already in November
The Communist leaders abroad had to be informed long before November 1939, if possible. Yet Stalin must have considered it necessary to inform them in a roundabout way. One of these ways went through the Times, where a news item containing the essence of Stalin's speech appeared on 26 August 1939. By way of introduction the item said that "British and French Communists have received a communication from M. Dimitroff in the name of Comintern. The document is said to give the following reasons to the Russo-German pact:
1) New tactics are felt to be necessary in view of the experience of the past five years, which have led to undesirable electoral and other alliances with democratic and bourgeois parties;
2) Although the adhesion of
3) The Soviet Government and the Comintern have therefore decided that it is best to hold aloof from any conflict, while remaining ready to interfere when the Powers engaged therein are weakened by war in the hope of securing a social revolution;
4) The pact is a great diplomatic
and ideological victory for
5) The chief obstacle to the
conclusion of an agreement between
The really important parts of this
"communication" are the statements that the
A few days later the European war broke out, according to plan. The intelligent readers, trained in Marxism-Leninism, would then have understood Stalin's policy and prepared themselves for the coming "social revolution", i.e. the Sovietization of Europe.
Many historians apparently write
about the Pact without checking the contemporary follow-up even in the most
distinguished newspapers. No wonder then that they have missed the more
complete summary of Stalin's speech that was published on 8 September 1939.
This occurred in the Swedish evening daily Svenska Pressen in
The final aim of the Comintern is
still the same as before: world revolution. However, all attempts at activating
revolution have failed. According to certain arguments from Marx, Engels and
Lenin (omitted from the news item) a lengthy war could hasten the outbreak of
revolution. But a pact between the
Therefore, in order to hasten
world revolution, the
(For the complete text of the Svenska Pressen cricular, see Stalin’s Politburo explains the Ribbentrop pact.)
It should have been one of the most important tasks for the foreign press attachés to report the full text of this news item to their respective governments. It seems, however, that none of them did.
Apparently, Stalin felt that all this was not enough. So three months later he granted the Pravda an interview. The editor "asked Comrade Stalin for his opinion of the Havas report of 'the speech' allegedly made 'by Stalin to the Politburo on 19 August', in which he is said to have expressed the thought that the war should go on as long as possible, so that the belligerents are exhausted." (See Stalin's August 1939 speech, evaluated!) The Pravda then quotes Comrade Stalin saying:
1) that it cannot be denied that
2) that Germany made peace proposals to France and England, proposals supported by the Soviet Union on the ground that a quick end to the war would ease the situation of all countries and peoples;
3) that the ruling circles of
The “Havas report” that Stalin mentions may refer to the then newly published article in Revue de Droit International that contained Stalin's speech of 19 August, supposedly provided by some member of the staff of Agence Havas. It emerges from the article that Stalin wanted his message to be conveyed to all Communist leaders.
The Pravda interview was published
Those who had studied Marxism-Leninism certainly knew that "easing the situation for all countries" would not promote world revolution in the least. And every reader of the Pravda would understand that if Stalin had spoken about "the war" on 19 August 1939, he would have referred to an expected or planned war, not any "present war". The road to the war was opened only on 23 August (with the Pact) and Hitler embarked on it on 1 September. Stalin's real attitude to war should emerge from the manner in which he translated words into deeds the very day when the interview was published. Those "in the know" were thus sufficiently informed that Stalin had concluded the Pact in order to make possible a war with prospects of exhausting the belligerents – even if Stalin formally denied the “Havas report”. The date of publishing would confirm that the phrases about peace were for the sake of appearance only.
Historians and Kremlinologists may be excused for not knowing about the item in the Svenska Pressen. It was republished (in English translation) only in 19847. To overlook the Pravda is, however, remarkable, to say the least.
Stalin's and Hitler's reasons for the Pact
Every serious historian certainly
realizes that neither Stalin nor Hitler felt himself bound to pacts, vows or
other commitments. All accept that at least Hitler entered into the Pact with
the intention to break it at the first suitable moment. Still they cling to the
thought that the Ribbentrop Pact prevented Hitler from breaking it during
precisely 22 months. What if Hitler had seen a suitable moment turning up after
22 days? Certainly, Hitler could have attacked the
In his book Mein Kampf Hitler had
made it clear that he considered a war on two fronts as a disaster for
Therefore, Hitler's reason for the
Pact must have been to make sure that the Western Powers should not interfere
when he attacked
Stalin, on the other hand, knew
that the German attack on
Hitler made no secret in those
August days about his being in great hurry to get an agreement with the
To summarize: Stalin realized that
without a pact with
The failure of the historians
The above line of argument is
carried out in the book The Incompatible Allies (
More recent authors, such as Geoffrey Roberts and Gabriel Gorodetsky disregard much more in their books on Stalin. In The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War (1995) and Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (1999) there is no mention of Stalin's speech of 19 August 1939 and no discussion of the value of a pact between two notoriously untrustworthy persons.
Actually, most historians have
failed to draw the logical conclusion that Stalin used the Pact as a means to
start a World War. Roberts and Gorodetsky had the opportunity to read Stalin's
own unveiled words. Other historians have had access to his veiled words in the
Pravda and the Times. And everybody could have looked up what initiated persons
thought about Stalin's intentions at the time. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop,
Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson and Stalin's biographer Boris Souvarine gave
their opinion along the same lines as Stalin in his speech. The French General
Schweisguth already in September 1936 anticipated that Stalin aimed at
releasing a ruthless war, into which the
A weighty confirmation emerged in
1951 when the defected Soviet Colonel Grigori Tokaev published his book Stalin
Means War. In this Tokaev testified what he had been thought at lectures at
Recently, at least one historian
has realized the importance of a dust-laden document that most of his
colleagues might have carelessly neglected. Says Professor Igor Lukes at
“A document obtained by the
The delegation was received by an official of the
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The Molotov‑Ribbentrop pact was
justified, he said: ‘If the
The long‑term Soviet strategy outlined in the
document obtained by the
It is obvious that there have been clues for any one who wanted to search into the motives of Stalin and the causes of the Second World War. In the last few years even Stalin's speech of 19 August 1939 has been available. Every serious historian writing on Stalin ought to be familiar with it, of course. In spite of this, there seems to exist an ideological resistance among most professional historians against recognizing Stalin as the instigator of W.W.II. The general public is blissfully ignorant of the fact that the sole profiteer of the War also was the very person who got it started, former bank robber Iosif Vissarionovich Dzugashvili, alias Stalin. Instead, many people still see Stalin as the peace loving defender of the Russian people.
The treachery of the allied leaders
Churchill and Roosevelt must take
on a large part of the responsibility for this state of things. They posed as
authorities setting the tone. As soon as the
The estimation that Churchill
published in 1948 passed by, without any critic reacting. He wrote15:
"[The] vital need [of the Soviets] was to hold the deployment positions of
the German armies as far to the West as possible so as to give the Russians
more time for assembling their forces from all parts of their immense empire.
[...] They must be in occupation of the
Nevertheless, rash pronouncements
of this kind were seen in book after book. A contributory cause may be the
Belief in authority and group pressure seem to be capable to make most academic historians ignore the rules imparted to them at their university education, nay even to ignore common sense.
1. Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, London 1961, p. 262-3.
2. Carr, Edward H., German-Soviet
Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939,
3. Revue de Droit International, de sciences diplomatiques et politiqueGenève, tome XVII, n:o 3, juillet-septembre 1939, pp. 247-8
4. The Times, 26 Aug. 1939, p. 9.
5. Svenska Pressen, Helsinki, 8 Sept. 1939, p. 4.
6. Pravda, 30 Nov. 1939.
7. Contrib. to Soviet and East European Research, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 103-
8. Speer, Albert, Erinnerungen, Frankfurt 1969, p. 179.
8. Ulam, Adam B., Expansion and Coexistence, N.Y., p. 277.
9. Stalin, Iosif, The Essential
Stalin: Major Theoretical Writings 1905-52,
11. Hilger, Gustav, and Meyer, Alfred, The Incompatible Allies, N.Y. 1953, p. 307.
12. Tokaev, Grigory, Stalin
13. Tokaev, p. 30
15. Churchill, Winston, The
Second World War, Part I,