Between 1938 and 1948 the Soviet Union absorbed Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and eastern Poland and turned most of Central Europe into satellite states. Finland, which had been part of the Russian Empire until 1917, was the conspicuous exception. Carl O. Nordling wrote a long essay arguing that this was not for want of trying: in his reading Stalin pursued the annexation of Finland through every available means for a full decade and failed each time.
His essay ranges from strikes in the Finnish metal industry in 1927 to the Communist ministers of the late 1940s. What follows concentrates on the episodes where his argument is sharpest, and on what Finnish and international research says about each.
The approach of 1938
In April 1938 a junior Soviet diplomat in Helsinki, Boris Yartsev, opened secret talks with the Finnish government. Moscow, he said, expected Germany to use Finland as a base for an attack, and if Finland could not keep the Germans out, the Red Army would advance to meet them on Finnish soil. Finland should therefore accept Soviet help, or at least give guarantees. The Finnish leaders, among them Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti and Prime Minister A. K. Cajander, replied that Finland would stay neutral and admit no foreign troops.
Nordling saw the Yartsev talks as the first step toward stationing Soviet forces in Finland without a fight. Most historians see them as a security probe that also revealed how little Moscow trusted Finnish neutrality. The talks are well documented and are not in dispute; the reading is.
The demands of October 1939
After the pact with Germany placed Finland in the Soviet sphere, Moscow pressed the Baltic states into base treaties and then turned north. In October and November 1939 Finnish negotiators led by J. K. Paasikivi met Stalin and Molotov in Moscow. The Soviet side asked for a 30-year lease of the Hanko peninsula as a naval base, a substantial shift of the border on the Karelian Isthmus away from Leningrad, several islands in the Gulf of Finland and the Finnish part of the Rybachy peninsula in the far north, offering in exchange a larger area of Soviet Karelia.
The stated purpose was the security of Leningrad. Nordling tested that claim with a naval argument. The narrowest point at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, he observed, lies between the Porkkala promontory on the Finnish side and the island of Naissaar off Tallinn, about 37 kilometers apart. Tsarist Russia had built its sea fortress across that line, and minefields laid there in 1914 held the German fleet out of the eastern Gulf throughout the First World War. A barrier between Hanko and Paldiski, by contrast, would span far wider water. If Leningrad's defense was the goal, he argued, Porkkala and Naissaar were the obvious choice.
According to the record of the talks that Nordling cited, Stalin mentioned Porkkala on 14 October and said he would not ask for it because it lay too close to Helsinki. Nordling concluded that Hanko was wanted for another reason: its ice-free harbor and its railway made it an ideal bridgehead for landing troops behind the Finnish army, much as a German division had landed there in April 1918 and reached Helsinki within days. He made a similar case about the Isthmus, where the claimed land included two Finnish coastal forts and part of the main defensive line.
Military historians accept that the Soviet demands would have crippled Finnish defense on the Isthmus. Whether that was their purpose or a side effect of wanting depth for Leningrad is the core of a long debate.
The Terijoki government
On 30 November 1939 the Red Army attacked along the entire border. The next day Moscow announced a "Finnish Democratic Republic" with a government under Otto Kuusinen, a Finnish Communist who had lived in Soviet Russia since 1918, based in the border village of Terijoki. On 2 December the Soviet Union signed a treaty with it, granting most of the territorial demands Finland had refused.
This is the strongest part of Nordling's case, and here he stands close to the mainstream. A puppet government ready to enter Helsinki is hard to reconcile with aims limited to border adjustments. Historians such as Carl Van Dyke, in The Soviet Invasion of Finland 1939–40 (1997), and Finnish scholars including Ohto Manninen and Kimmo Rentola have shown that the campaign was planned as a short war ending in a Soviet-friendly regime. Where they differ from Nordling is on how fixed that aim was: the Kremlin dropped Kuusinen without hesitation once the war went badly, which suggests an option pursued while it was cheap.
Nordling added a detail of his own. In November 1939 the Comintern summoned Arvo Tuominen, a Finnish Communist then in Stockholm, to Moscow for an important assignment. Tuominen refused and broke with the movement. Nordling believed the post intended for him was the premiership that went to Kuusinen.
Peace and pressure, 1940–1941
The Winter War ended with the Moscow Peace Treaty, signed on 12 March 1940 and in force the next day. Finland lost the Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the shores of Lake Ladoga and other land, and leased Hanko to the Soviet Union. Nordling argued that the new border was drawn to give the Red Army a better starting line for another attack. The fighting in the final weeks is the subject of The Winter War: sacrificing men or machines?
In the months that followed, Moscow vetoed a proposed defensive alliance of Finland, Sweden and Norway, and later a Finnish-Swedish union. A pro-Soviet society in Finland held loud public meetings in the summer of 1940, and the Soviet Union demanded transit rights by rail to Hanko. These facts are not disputed. Their meaning is: Nordling saw a rehearsal of the Baltic pattern, while many historians see a mix of pressure and opportunism that eased in the autumn of 1940.
1944 and 1948
In June 1944, three days after the Normandy landings, the Red Army opened a heavy offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and took Vyborg on 20 June. Finnish forces stopped it at Tali-Ihantala and on the shores of the Gulf of Vyborg. Nordling read the offensive as a second attempt at conquest; it is discussed in In the shade of Normandy. The armistice of 19 September 1944 replaced the Hanko lease with one at Porkkala, the very promontory Stalin had said in 1939 he would not ask for.
After the war the Communist Yrjö Leino became Minister of the Interior, and in 1948 Finland signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Nordling saw an attempted takeover on the Prague model. He quoted the Yugoslav Communist Milovan Djilas, who recorded Zhdanov saying in early 1948 that it had been a mistake not to occupy Finland, and Molotov answering that Finland was a mere peanut. Finnish research since the opening of the Soviet archives, notably Rentola's, has not found evidence of a coup ordered from Moscow in 1948. Leino was dismissed that spring after a parliamentary vote of no confidence, and Finland stayed a parliamentary democracy.
Nordling's own count of these episodes leaves one detail open. Porkkala, the place he said Stalin should have wanted in 1939, was handed back to Finland in 1956, long after Stalin's death, by a Soviet leadership that had decided it was no longer needed.
Questions and answers
What did the Soviet Union demand from Finland in 1939?
A 30-year lease of the Hanko peninsula as a naval base, a move of the border on the Karelian Isthmus away from Leningrad, several islands in the Gulf of Finland and Finland's part of the Rybachy peninsula. In exchange it offered a larger area of Soviet Karelia. Finland offered smaller concessions, and the talks broke down in November 1939.
What was the Terijoki government?
A Soviet-sponsored "people's government" of Finland headed by the Communist Otto Kuusinen, announced on 1 December 1939 in the border village of Terijoki after the Red Army invaded. Moscow signed a treaty with it the next day. It was dissolved quietly when the Soviet Union made peace with the real Finnish government in March 1940.
Do historians agree that Stalin meant to annex Finland in 1939?
Most agree that the Winter War was launched with the aim of installing a pro-Soviet regime, as the Terijoki government shows. They disagree with Nordling that annexation was a fixed goal pursued for a decade. The prevailing view describes shifting Soviet aims in which security, opportunity and ideology all played a part.
Was there a Communist coup attempt in Finland in 1948?
Rumors of one circulated in the spring of 1948, and Nordling believed Moscow wanted it. Research in Finnish and Soviet records has not confirmed a coup plan. Finland signed the 1948 treaty on terms that kept its internal system intact, and the Interior Minister Yrjö Leino was dismissed after losing a confidence vote.



