Before he wrote a full journal article on the subject, Carl O. Nordling put together a short evaluation of the alleged Politburo speech in September 2004. It is a compact document: a few paragraphs on where the text came from, then a numbered list of reasons to treat it as genuine, with six source notes. Read today, it is a useful map of the circumstantial case, and also of its limits.
The claim being tested
The starting point is the report printed in the Geneva Revue de Droit International: Stalin addressed the Politburo at ten in the evening on 19 August 1939, and the outcome was the non-aggression pact with Germany signed four days later. The gist, as Nordling put it, was that the pact was needed because it would let Hitler start a European war that would exhaust all the belligerents and leave the Soviet Union to gain from the wreckage. The report adds that the Politburo then asked Dmitry Manuilsky and Georgi Dimitrov, two senior Comintern figures, to draft instructions explaining the pact to Communist parties abroad, with Stalin directing the work.
Nordling noted that both known versions, the Geneva text and the Moscow archival text, are defective, and he suspected the Russian one was translated from a French original. He named the two principal sceptics: Eberhard Jäckel, writing in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte in 1958, and Sergey Sluch, whose 2004 article in Otechestvennaya istoriya called it a speech that was never given. The full content is described on the main page for Stalin's speech of 19 August 1939.
Nordling's list of indications
His evidence falls into three groups.
Stalin's own earlier statements. From the mid-1920s Stalin had written that rivalry among the capitalist powers would lead to wars that weakened them and sped up revolution. In a speech to the Central Committee in January 1925 he said that if war came the Soviet Union should not sit idle but should enter it last, to tip the scales. Both passages are genuine and appear in Stalin's collected works.
Witnesses who heard similar ideas in 1939. Arvo Tuominen, a Finnish Communist leader who knew Stalin and broke with Moscow in late 1939, wrote in 1941 that Stalin could have prevented the war had he wished. Grigory Tokaev, a Soviet officer who defected to Britain in 1947, recalled lectures in 1939 by the diplomat Alexander Troyanovsky and a general named Voloshin urging that the Western powers and Germany be driven to fight each other to exhaustion. The historian Igor Lukes found a report by the American consul in Prague about Czech Communists who had been given a similar explanation in Moscow after the war began.
Features of the documents themselves. Two differing versions, Nordling argued, rule out a single journalist's invention. Instructions matching the speech's logic were in print long before the speech, in a Helsinki newspaper on 8 September 1939 (see Stalin's Politburo explains the Ribbentrop pact). And Stalin's denial in Pravda on 30 November talked about peace proposals but never denied wanting a long war.
What the list proves and what it does not
The first group is strong evidence for one thing: Stalin had long expected and welcomed a war among capitalist states. Almost no historian disputes that. It is weak evidence that he made this particular speech on this particular evening, because anyone who had read his published works could have written a text in the same spirit.
The second group has a similar problem. Tuominen and Tokaev wrote after breaking with the Soviet system, and their accounts are memoirs, not records. The Prague report is second-hand. Each shows that the "let them exhaust each other" idea circulated in 1939. None places Stalin in a room on 19 August.
The third group is the most interesting, and the most contested. Two versions can come from one forgery that was translated twice; differences between them are what translation produces. A Comintern circular in a small Helsinki paper fits the speech's argument, but its own origin is unknown. Stalin's denial was a political statement written to blame Britain and France for the war, and silence on a detail is thin ground for an inference.
Sluch's reply covers the gap Nordling's list leaves open: the Politburo's records show no meeting that day, the log of Stalin's visitors shows no Comintern officials, and the speech says nothing a well-read journalist in Paris could not have guessed by November. Nordling answered those points two years later in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies article.
Where it leaves the reader
Nordling's list is honest about its sources and cites them precisely, down to page numbers in Tokaev's memoir and Tuominen's 1941 book. That makes it easy to check. The checking supports his background claim about Stalin's thinking and leaves the authenticity of the document itself unproven, which is where most historians still place it. His wider thesis, that Stalin used the pact to start the war on purpose, is argued in Did Stalin evoke World War II?.
Questions and answers
What is the strongest point in favor of the speech?
The match between its argument and Stalin's published views since the mid-1920s, together with Dimitrov's diary entry of 7 September 1939, where Stalin welcomed the capitalist powers weakening each other. That shows the ideas were Stalin's. It does not show that the reported meeting took place or that the text records it.
What is the strongest point against it?
The lack of any record of a Politburo session on 19 August 1939, combined with a log of Stalin's office visitors that shows no Comintern officials that day. Add the unclear route by which a secret Kremlin text reached a Havas correspondent in Geneva, and most specialists find the documentary case too weak.
Who were Manuilsky and Dimitrov?
Dmitry Manuilsky (1883–1959) was a Ukrainian-born Bolshevik who served as a leading Soviet representative in the Communist International. Georgi Dimitrov (1882–1949), a Bulgarian, was its General Secretary from 1935. The report names them as the men tasked with briefing foreign Communist parties on the pact.
Did Nordling change his view after 2004?
No. His 2006 article in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies kept the same conclusion and added answers to Sluch and Jäckel, plus the Dimitrov diary entry. He conceded that the surviving texts may not reproduce Stalin's words exactly but held that their substance came from Stalin.



