The question in the title was also the title of an article Carl O. Nordling published in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies in 2006 (volume 19, pages 93–106). It was the fullest statement of his view that the text attributed to Stalin's Politburo meeting of 19 August 1939 preserves, in substance, something Stalin actually said. The article answers two critics by name, Eberhard Jäckel and Sergey Sluch, and then offers a scenario of its own for how the text reached the West.
The thesis is a minority position. Most historians of Soviet foreign policy consider the speech a fabrication or an unverifiable rumor, and the reasons are summarized on the main page for Stalin's speech of 19 August 1939. What follows sets out Nordling's argument as he made it and notes where it has and has not persuaded others.
The sceptics' case in brief
Sluch, writing in Moscow in 2004, made four main objections. The speech contains nothing that Western newspapers were not already speculating about in the autumn of 1939; he cited the Paris daily L'Époque of 2 November, which described the pact as a trap that would let Stalin wait until both sides were exhausted. Some phrasing, such as Latin tags, is foreign to Stalin's style. The Politburo held very few formal sessions that year, and none is recorded for 19 August. And the log of visitors to Stalin's office for that day lists Molotov, Mikoyan and a handful of others, but no Comintern officials.
Jäckel's 1958 study took a different line. He traced the Havas text to the agency's Geneva correspondent and found two inconsistent accounts of how the man got it. He also noted rival versions of the speech and a set of alleged Comintern instructions printed in Paris in December 1939. Taken together, he judged, these oddities made the text too unreliable for scholarly use, even if its content roughly matched Stalin's motives.
Nordling's replies, point by point
On style, Nordling argued that no one has Stalin's own words. Every known version descends from a French text, so a Latin phrase such as modus vivendi could be the translator's choice as easily as the speaker's. He also objected to Sluch calling the text a shorthand record, since none of the versions claims to be one.
On the missing meeting, his reply was practical. Stalin cannot have committed the country to a pact with Hitler without telling his closest colleagues, and if the formal register shows only two Politburo sessions in all of 1939, then the register cannot be a full list of meetings. A conference at the Kremlin or at Stalin's dacha in the days before 23 August was, in his view, certain. This point carries weight; Politburo business in the late 1930s often happened informally. It does not, however, place a speech of this content on 19 August.
On the newspaper parallels, Nordling agreed that the idea was in the air. He listed others who had guessed at it before the text appeared: the émigré biographer Boris Souvarine, the British ambassador in Berlin Nevile Henderson, the French general Schweisguth as early as 1936, and a Swedish journalist, Valentin Sjöberg. If so many outsiders could imagine such a strategy, he asked, why not Stalin himself? The argument is fair as far as it goes. It answers the claim that the idea was too elaborate for Stalin; it does not answer the claim that a forger could have written it.
The Warsaw clue
Nordling's most concrete argument concerns one phrase. The French and German texts promise the Soviet Union a share of Poland reaching up to the approaches of Warsaw. By November 1939 it was public knowledge that the Soviet zone ended well east of the city, since the boundary treaty of 28 September had moved the line east to the Bug. The secret protocol of 23 August, still unpublished in 1939, had drawn it along the Vistula, close to Warsaw. A forger writing in November, Nordling reasoned, had little reason to use a phrase that fitted only the secret August arrangement.
The phrase "the three Baltic states" points the other way, since it fits November, when Moscow had imposed treaties on all three, better than August. Nordling's answer was a hypothesis about mishearing: a French listener taking down the Russian pribaltiyskikh as tri baltiyskikh. Critics regard this as special pleading. Rumors of the first Vistula line also circulated in 1939, which weakens the Warsaw argument.
A scenario of transmission
The second half of the article builds a story. In Nordling's reconstruction, Manuilsky and Dimitrov first issued a short explanation of the pact, which The Times of London reported on 26 August 1939, then a fuller circular in question-and-answer form, which the Helsinki evening paper Svenska Pressen printed on 8 September (both are described in Stalin's Politburo explains the Ribbentrop pact). When the circular went unnoticed, he suggested, Stalin had the speech itself leaked through an intermediary to the Havas office in Geneva, timed to appear just before the attack on Finland on 30 November, and then denied it in Pravda the same day.
He was candid that this was one possible explanation among several. As history it has a basic weakness: each step is inferred from the result it is meant to explain, and no document shows Soviet officials arranging any of it. A deliberate leak of a speech that the Kremlin then publicly denounced as a lie is also an unusual way to brief foreign Communists, who were in any case receiving guidance through Comintern channels.
The Dimitrov diary
After finishing the article, Nordling added a postscript on Georgi Dimitrov's diary, published in German in 2000. Its entry for 7 September 1939 records Stalin, in the presence of Molotov and Zhdanov, describing the war as a fight between two groups of capitalist states and saying that Moscow had nothing against their weakening each other. This is genuine, contemporary and much cited. For Nordling it was the strongest support he had.
Historians such as Geoffrey Roberts accept the diary entry and read it as evidence of Stalin's opportunism once the war had begun. Reading it backward as proof of a plan announced on 19 August is a further step that most do not take. The entry shows what Stalin thought after the war began. It cannot show that the Havas text records his words a fortnight earlier, which is exactly the question in the title. Nordling's own wider thesis, that the pact was meant to start the war, is the subject of Did Stalin evoke World War II?; the short list of indications he drew up two years before the article is discussed in the speech evaluated.
Questions and answers
Where was Nordling's article published?
In the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, volume 19, in 2006, on pages 93 to 106, under the title of this essay. The journal publishes research on Soviet and East European military history. Publication there gave the argument a scholarly hearing, though it did not change the prevailing view among specialists.
What was Sluch's strongest point?
The documentary one. Politburo records list no session on 19 August 1939, and the visitor log for Stalin's office shows no Comintern figures that day. Combined with the unclear route of the text through a news agency, this makes it hard to treat the document as a record of a real meeting.
Did anyone else defend the speech?
A few Russian writers in the 1990s and some authors who argue that the Soviet Union planned an offensive war in Europe have cited it. Historians such as Gabriel Gorodetsky and David Glantz have rejected the offensive-war thesis the speech is often used to support.
Does the dispute change how the pact is understood?
Only at the margins. The secret protocol, Soviet territorial gains in 1939–40 and Stalin's hope that the capitalist powers would weaken each other are documented without the speech. The dispute is about whether Stalin deliberately aimed to start a general war, a claim that rests heavily on this one contested text.



